The Iranian missile and drone attack against Israel on Sunday night was effectively intercepted and did not prompt an immediate Israeli response but there is still much uncertainty whether it will lead to a de-escalation of the conflict and what role the EU will play.
As previously reported, more than 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones were fired by Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Iraq and Syria against military targets in Israel. 99 % of them were intercepted by the Israeli multi-layered air defense system in cooperation with an alliance of the US, the UK, France, and moderate Arab Sunni countries. Some of the Iranian ballistic missiles reportedly misfired.
In a statement on Sunday afternoon by Josep Borrell, EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU condemned “in the strongest terms the Iranian drone and missile attacks against Israel”. This is an unprecedented escalation and a threat to regional security, according to the statement.
After the erosion of EU’s support to Israel as the Israel-Hamas war dragged on and resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip, the EU reiterated its commitment to the security of Israel. But it also called on all parties to exercise utmost restraint in the new explosive situation which could trigger a full-scale multi-front war in the Middle East.
The statement says that the EU remains “fully committed to contribute to de-escalation and the security of the region.” The High Representative invited the EU foreign ministers to an extraordinary video tele-conference on Tuesday afternoon (16 April) to discuss EU’s contribution to de-escalation in the region. What this concretely means is for the time being not clear.
Can the successful interception of the missiles be seen as an Israeli victory which does not require any further Israeli military responses against Iran? Opinions among academic experts are nuanced when assessing the Iranian missile attack and Israel’s strategic policy options.
”The success against the Iranian attack does not resolve the problem created on October 7, and does not erase the intelligence failure of October 7,” Professor Meir Litvak at the Department of Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University and a senior research associate at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, told The Brussels Times.
“Israel may decide to contain the attack and not retaliate by saying that Iran had failed, in order to avoid further escalation. On the other hand, it would not wish to project weakness. It is not easy to balance between these needs.”
Professor Eyal Zisser at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies described the interception as a significant achievement. But he cautioned that the picture is always complex because one has to remember that Iran attacked Israel directly from its territory for the first time. “There is no victory for either side. Military response is a matter of cost and benefit”.
Dr Liora Hendelman-Baavur, senior research associate at The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, replied that following the previous failure, Israel's successful interception can be seen as a critical victory but it gives also rise to pressing questions about the path forward. “The answer to the question about the Israeli response remains nuanced, hinging on Iran's future actions and the evolving regional landscape.”
Has Israel's deterrence been restored? ”No, because Iran did attack, and threatened to attack again, replied Meir Litvak. ”You don’t achieve deterrence by successful defense.”
Eyal Zisser agrees. The fact that Iran attacked Israel shows that there was no deterrence but on the other hand Iran was cautious not to attack civilian targets. It also said after the attack that the matter was over from its side. “Deterrence is an elusive concept. There is deterrence in the sense that neither side wants war but no deterrence in the sense that the Iranians were prepared to attack directly Israel.”
“While the interception demonstrates Israel's defensive capabilities, sustaining deterrence requires a multifaceted strategy, balancing defensive measures with diplomatic efforts,” Liora Hendelman-Baavur replied.
None of the experts believe that the Iranian attack was orchestrated to be symbolic, avoiding significant damage in Israel, as some media has speculated. On the contrary, it was coordinated in order to cause maximum damage. The combination of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic rockets was designed to confront Israel with a major technological challenge.
What is the risk of a full-scale war involving both Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon? It is difficult to assess according to the experts. Hezbollah has also to consider its interests in Lebanon and try to avoid escalation into a full-scale war, leaving it to the Iranians to react to an direct Israeli attack. But it also depends on the type of Israeli response if there will be one.
The need for strategic constraint is obvious considering the consequences a full-scale war. “A full-scale war is something very disastrous and neither Israel nor someone else will gain anything from it,” replied Eyal Zisser. “All will pay a heavy price. In short, it’s preferable to avoid such a war.”
Meir Litvak was more specific. “A full-scale war will be a major challenge to Israel as Iran has over 2000 ballistic rockets. Hizbollah has over 140,000 rockets aimed against Israel, and highly trained fighter force. Iran is 1500km away from Israel, so sending Israeli airplanes against Iran is not simple. Such a war may bring about very serious damage to Israel, but also to Iran, and to Lebanon, should Hizbollah join the fight.”
What can the international community, especially the US and the EU, do to dissuade Israel from a direct confrontation with Iran, as some factions within the current Israeli government advocate?
“They should also stand with Israel against Iranian attacks,” Meir LItvak replied. “Iran has been waging a war of attrition against Israel, and has been calling for the destruction of Israel, not the other way around. Hizbollah has been bombing and shelling Israel for six months. Giving Israel support and assurances against Iran will help contain the extremists in the country.”
“The US can put pressure on Israel and also propose a carrot, economic and military aid, which will offer Israel benefits that will exceed any gains from attacking Iran,” Eyal Zisser added. “Diplomatic engagement, dialogue, and fostering regional cooperation are pivotal in steering away from escalation,” Liora Hendelman-Baavur stressed, referring to the EU discussions on de-escalation.
In the meantime, Israel will probably continue its efforts to pre-empt Iranian transfers of weapons to Hizballah. It cannot eliminate the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles altogether but will continue to hit Iran as it has done over the past decades - indirectly and without taking responsibility for it - both in Syria and on Iranian soil.
In addressing the Iranian conventional threat, Israel's approach must prioritize defensive measures while engaging in diplomatic initiatives, Liora Hendelman-Baavur summarized. “Leveraging advanced defense systems and technological capabilities, Israel aims to maintain deterrence while advocating for regional stability.”
The challenge for the EU is to agree on a new common position and to use both carrots and sticks in its relation with the current far-right Israeli government. Josep Borrell has talked about the need to relaunch the two-state solution process. This could also be an opportunity to link it to the strategic alliance which intercepted the Iranian missiles and convene an international peace conference as soon as possible
For Israel, this could be an opportunity to change course since 7 October and reinforce an international alliance to break its isolation and instead isolate and put pressure on Iran. The theocratic and authoritarian regime in Iran, a nuclear threshold country, is not only a deadly threat against Israel but threatens also Europe’s security by supporting Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine.
If this is a realistic scenario depends very much on the Israeli Prime Minister who has not taken responsibility for the failure on 7 October and is afraid of new elections. He is also under pressure from his extremist coalition partners to continue the war in Gaza and to respond directly against Iran’s missile attack.
M. Apelblat
The Brussels Times
