On April 7th, the President and First Lady of Rwanda lit a flame of remembrance that will continue to burn until July. The lighting of this flame at the Kigali Genocide Memorial in the Rwandan capital marked the beginning of a 100-day commemoration period for the 30th anniversary of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
During these 100 days thirty years ago, extremists from Rwanda’s Hutu ethnic majority exterminated around 800,000 ethnic Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. As the international community annually reflects on its failure to prevent this genocide in Rwanda, it continues to neglect the plight of communities related to or associated with the Tutsi in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Behind the 1994 genocide lay an ideology, rooted in colonial-era divisions, that viewed Tutsi as “invaders.” This ideology still threatens Tutsi in eastern DRC.
A transnational crisis
Since 1996, 6 million people have died from conflict-related deaths in eastern DRC, where over 100 armed groups operate today. Within this highly complex context, the mainly Tutsi “March 23 Movement” insurgency (M23) has dominated international reporting on eastern DRC since 2021.
M23’s first rebellion lasted from 2012 to 2013 and received support from Rwanda, and the UN says that Rwanda has been supporting its current insurgency. It has also exacerbated hostilities against Congolese Tutsi and other minorities commonly referred to as “Banyarwanda” or “Rwandophones” (communities considered to be of Rwandan descent).
These recent hostilities have added to years of persecution against vulnerable minorities. In recent years, Tutsi and other “Rwandophones” have been targeted in hate crimes including lynchings and manhunts. Self-styled “indigenous” ethnic-based militias known as “Mai-Mai” and ethnic Hutu militias called “Nyatura” have also targeted Tutsi in North Kivu with the reported aim of uprooting them.
Meanwhile, in South Kivu province, Mai-Mai from various ethnic groups have targeted the Tutsi-related Banyamulenge community with violence since 2017. This violence has often been accompanied by hateful— even genocidal — online rhetoric echoing the anti-Tutsi discourses once propagated in Rwanda. Similarly, in Ituri province, militias called “CODECO” have systematically attacked a community called the Hema.
The severity of this issue has led some lawmakers in the United States to break the silence. In February, Congressman André Carson of Indiana introduced a resolution, co-sponsored so far by ten other members of Congress, condemning violence against Congolese minorities.
This issue should also matter to European policymakers, given the role that the European Union could play in addressing violence in DRC. It also matters due to the legacy of Belgian colonial rule in both DRC and Rwanda and the lessons learned from France supporting Rwanda’s genocidal post-colonial regime and overlooking warning signs of genocide.
A legacy of colonialism
Conflicts in DRC have various causes. Yet, anti-Tutsi discourses in both Rwanda, which was colonized by Germany and then Belgium, and DRC have been historically influenced by a colonial-era myth called the Hamitic Hypothesis. This myth constructed pastoralist groups of Central Africa’s Great Lakes Region, including Tutsi, as outsiders that had come to dominate “indigenous” Bantu farmer groups, including Hutu in Rwanda.
The fact that the Belgian colonizers deprived Banyamulenge of their own local customary authority also reinforced the perception among other local ethnic communities that they were non-indigenous.
In 1981, the post-colonial parliament of DRC (then “Zaire”) passed a law revoking the citizenship of communities that had arrived in the country after colonialism began in 1885. This law was wrongly used against Banyamulenge and other “Rwandophones”. In the 1990s, the state’s collapse enabled the formation of Mai-Mai, who contributed to an increased persecution of Tutsi and Banyamulenge.
During the ensuing Congo Wars (1996-2003), some Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge fighters supported a Rwandan-backed insurgency. The post-genocide Rwandan government backed this insurgency and invaded with its own army after a Rwandan Hutu extremist militia that had perpetrated the 1994 genocide fled to Zaire and continued to pose a security threat.
After the wars, the DRC’s 2004 nationality law changed the cut-off date for acquiring citizenship to 1960. However, Tutsi and Banyamulenge are still widely seen as Rwandans. The Rwandan Hutu extremist militia was also not defeated during the wars and has remained in eastern DRC. It has since been renamed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and has reportedly encouraged anti-Tutsi sentiment.
Banyamulenge have largely distanced themselves from Rwanda, which has backed several insurgencies in eastern DRC, including M23. These insurgencies have mainly recruited from marginalized Tutsi in North Kivu, but they have reinforced discourses and a popular conspiracy theory claiming that all Tutsi are invaders.
Remaining vulnerable amid evolving conflict dynamics
Unable to solve eastern DRC’s insecurity, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi has recently exploited populist sentiments that increase the vulnerability of Tutsi groups. Notably, he has encouraged the youth to create “vigilance groups” and allowed militias to support the army against M23.
Numerous militias have united under the umbrella of “Wazalendo” (“patriots”). Meanwhile, the reported collaboration between the Congolese army and the FDLR displays the continued division between perceived “Bantu” groups and Tutsi “outsiders”.
In narrowly focusing on M23, the international community and media overlook the vulnerability of Tutsi communities associated with the insurgency. The U.N. peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, is expected to leave DRC this year due to its unpopularity and failure to prevent violence. This has created uncertainty about the security of Congolese civilians and the suitability of relying on replacement forces from the Southern African Development Community, an intergovernmental organization that risks being under-resourced.
Though the former and current U.N. special advisors on genocide prevention have warned of the rise in anti-Tutsi rhetoric and violence, and the E.U. has condemned hate speech in DRC, these statements have triggered little international reaction.
The prevalence of anti-Tutsi hostilities in eastern DRC signifies that the damaging legacy of European colonialism that contributed to the Rwandan genocide still needs to be confronted at a regional level as part of broader efforts to build an inclusive peace in eastern DRC. Until such peace is realized, the international community must remember its responsibility to protect DRC’s forgotten and endangered Tutsi and other minorities.
This opinion article is co-authored by Dr. Delphin Ntanyoma, a visiting researcher at the University of Leeds.
