Reading the 81 pages of the minutes of the Israeli government meeting where the first of the Oslo Accords was approved, two weeks before its signing on 13 September in 1993, is a shocking experience. The document that was published for the first time about two weeks ago reveals the tense atmosphere that prevailed among the decision-makers behind the dramatic decision.
On the one hand - a deep conviction that this was a necessary historical step for preserving Israel's character as a Jewish and democratic state by placing a physical buffer between the two peoples and establishing a Palestinian entity in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. On the other hand - a serious fear and assessment that the move could be reversed, something that would happen seven years later when the Oslo process collapsed following the outbreak of the second intifada.
The discussion that took place on 30 August thirty years ago reveals both deep uncertainty towards accepting the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a partner in the future agreement and skepticism about the ability to present it to the public in Israel. The move contradicted Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's long-standing rejection of a dialogue with the PLO and deep suspicion about the willingness of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to abandon the path of terror.
The decision to move through the Oslo route (named after the Norwegian capital where secret talks took place) was based on the assumption that a political settlement could not be promoted with the leadership in the territories but only with the PLO. This was an argument that in retrospect should have been examined more critically, since the PLO was deeply weakened after the first Gulf War.
However, PLO grew stronger as the Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories was pushed away by the “Tunis group" (where Arafat had set up his headquarters) with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) following the Oslo Accords.
The Oslo Accord is one of the decisive junctures in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular and the Israeli-Arab conflict in general. Although the event was accompanied by intense storms, suffered from fragility and did not gain consensus among the two peoples, its foundations exist to this day. Even those who opposed the agreement, such as the center and right-wing elements in Israel that have been in power for most of the time since then, accept it as an existing fact.
This is both due to its practical expressions that took root on the ground, the broad international support for it, and the understanding that any alternative to the Accords will exact a heavy strategic price on Israel.
The Oslo Accords embodied a number of dramatic historical precedents. It was the first time that the leaders of the two peoples recognized each other and formulated an arrangement based on territorial division of the country (“land for peace”). As a result of the agreement, the Palestinian Authority was founded - the first Palestinian state entity in the territory of historical Palestine although it did not gain the status of a sovereign state.
Why the Oslo process failed
The question of the reasons for the failure of the Oslo process and the renewal of the violent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians continue to raise fierce debates to this day and is accompanied by mutual accusations.
Israelis claim that the Palestinians were reluctant to make peace while the latter accuse Israel of a continuous change of the reality on the ground in the territories. Supporters of the agreement in Israel claim that it turned out to be a mistake caused by miscalculations on both sides. Its opponents maintain that it was because of a premeditated “plot” by Arafat.
Whatever the reason, all the dangers raised when the agreement was signed have come true. Furthermore, there is a broad consensus that the deployment of the negotiations over several years, and the gradual implementation of the accords, was a major design failure, as it allowed withdrawals from the accords and disruptions during the process.
The signing of the agreement was followed by upheavals in Israeli-Palestinian relations. It resulted in an internal Palestinian divide, with the takeover by Hamas of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and its non-recognition of the accords. As a result, what exists today is a hybrid reality between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river similar to an archeological site. It is comprised by a variety of interwoven situations, representing strategic initiatives and historical experiences that have begun to take form.
Thus, there are five political situations and Palestinian civil statuses. (1) Area A in the West Bank, over which the PA administers civil and security matters, (2) Area B in the West Bank, where it only administers civil matters and Israel has security control; (3) Area C (63% of the Westbank), over which Israel has full control; (4) The Gaza Strip, where the status of Hamas as sovereign is unclear; (5) East Jerusalem where the majority of the Palestinians are non-citizen residents with Israeli ID-cards.
Besides all these, there are the Arab citizens in Israel (ca 20 % of the total population), with equal rights and a growing national awareness and affinity for the Palestinians in the other areas.
Two-state solution unlikely now
The great ideologies of the past have been replaced by the concept of “Economic Peace”. It has become Israel's unofficial policy in the Palestinian context and is promoted through a variety of "gestures" and "concessions" to ease the situation. This policy is based on a long-standing Israeli assumption that Israel can maintain security stability, and continue to control the occupied territories without having to make any decisions, by improving the daily lives of the Palestinians.
In fact, economic peace is a Pyrrhic victory: it might achieve some security in the short and medium terms and prevent the outbreak of a third intifada, but at the same time it deepens the unintended merger between the two communities.
In the discussion of the strategic alternatives to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two stand out that are constantly discussed, although they are losing their relevance. The first is the two-state vision which is not on the agenda of the current Israeli government.
There is a fundamental difficulty, at least in the foreseeable future, in realizing the concept as envisioned three decades ago, and this for two reasons. Firstly, the Palestinian divide has resulted in two separate arenas (the Westbank and Gaza) driven by the power of competing ideas. Secondly, the increase in Israeli settlement construction has transformed the area, from about 110,000 settlers in 1993 to almost half million today in the Westbank.
The second alternative is conflict management, which means preserving or improving the reality in the Palestinian areas, in particular through economic means. Different options are linked to this alternative:
Former Prime-Minister Menachem Begin's vision of civilian but not territorial autonomy comes to one’s mind in this context: reducing/shrinking the conflict and tension by focusing on improving the lives of the Palestinians and reducing their contact with Israel, without a geographical buffer between the two communities, and the establishment of some form of local autonomy. However, none of these ideas are accepted by the Palestinian or the international community. They also rely excessively on the economic dimension while ignoring the divide and deep national gap between the two communities.
Two strategic alternatives, both bad
Israel currently faces only two strategic alternatives, which reflect a choice between bad and worse. Absent the two-state solution, there is the one state-solution, an old concept that already is gradually taking form on the ground without any planning, willingness or awareness. If Israel will find itself in this situation, it will have to choose between a state for all its citizens, which will not necessarily be Zionist, or the establishment of a regime based on two forms of citizenship bearing the characteristics of an apartheid regime.
In both cases, it is likely that the one-state solution will be the beginning of a new historical chapter in the conflict akin to "Balkanization”. Each of the two nations in a bi-national state will strive to become dominant at the expense of the other one in such an entity. This might lead to even more widespread violence than before.
There is still one stop on the way to the one-state solution - a unilateral decision by Israel. The intention is to converge towards border lines that will leave most of the Jewish settlements close to the “green line” and in the Jordan Valley under Israel's sovereignty. Such a solution should if possible be coordinated with the Palestinians to avoid a repetition of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. If the Palestinians are not interested or able to do so, it is possible and even necessary to implement it unilaterally.
The precedent of the disengagement from the Gaza Strip gave rise to risks that may develop early in any new unilateral course of action by Israel. The areas from where Israel will withdraw are likely to be taken over by terrorist groups, posing a security threat to Israel, while the Palestinian areas will continue to be economically dependent on Israel. And worst of all – it will cause a sharp rift in Israeli society which already is deeply polarized.
Still, this is a better alternative than the one-state solution, a reality that is expected to endanger the existence of Israel as a democratic state with a Jewish majority.
In the future, with other and younger people leading both peoples, such a scenario could be the basic layer of a new political arrangement and the revival of the two-state solution, based on joint prosperity and supported by the international community, including the EU. One can only hope that the next generation of the conflict will be wiser than its ancestors, free of the bitter memories of the past and focused on developing their present life.
