As Europe charts a path to “go at it alone” on security and Ukraine, leaders should not be stymied by the hope that America may eventually recommit to the transatlantic alliance. They should instead focus on keeping populism at bay at home, writes Pablo Rasmussen, former Biden-Harris Administration official
In the seven weeks since Donald Trump’s inauguration as President of the United States, his administration has reshaped the power of the presidency, imposed his culture war agenda on science and education, and taken a hacksaw approach to cutting the bureaucracy. If his actions at home were not enough to sink perceptions of America abroad, then his Oval Office bullying of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and tariff flip-flopping may finally mark the end of the era of American power.
To our allies in Europe, this is either their worst nightmare – especially among those cautiously optimistic that Trump’s second term would be much like the first – or a long-awaited “I told you so” moment, like France’s decades-long warnings about dependency on the United States. Regardless, the wake-up call has been answered and Europe is now working in earnest to build up their defense industrial base, boost materiel and financial support to Ukraine, and construct a security architecture that isn’t wholly dependent on the whims of the White House.
For those of us who have been ardently pro-NATO, pro-EU, and pro-Ukraine in the U.S., the growing schism across the Atlantic is dagger through the heart, only somewhat mitigated by the ambition of Europe’s response. However, if Europe is to succeed, not only will it have to invest, build, and overcome barriers at a formidable pace, it will also have to seriously reflect on what a post-Trump transatlantic alliance can look like and keep at bay the same political forces that brought Trump back to power.
Speaking for the nation?
Americans, for the most part, are widely supportive of both NATO and Ukraine. It would be a stretch of the imagination to attribute Trump’s victory to a rejection of transatlanticism or American isolationism, as some in Europe have done. More likely, foreign policy was not a major factor in the election.
It would therefore be a mistake to assume that Americans’ latent support for Europe will necessarily mean a return to the status quo in four years. The electorate’s skepticism of American global leadership is likely to remain. A post-Trump foreign policy, especially one led by Democrats, will have to contend with fixing a whole slew of own-goals around the world, of which the transatlantic relationship is unlikely to be among the priorities.
Rather, Europe can offer a much more balanced relationship, a pragmatic one borne out of its own strategic reawakening. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has tried to assure, the U.S. will continue to be an “ally”, despite Trump and his acolytes’ best efforts. But the nature of the alliance will change not only in the burden sharing of the defense costs, but also through candid assessment of where our priorities align and where they do not.
Post-Trump, even those of us most eager to restore our ties with Europe will likely have to focus on democracy building at home, repairing the self-inflicted setbacks in the competition with China, restoring ties to Asian allies, or rebuilding a 21st-century development infrastructure with our partners in the Global South.
A successful foreign policy for the Democratic Party will mean looking forward rather than another episode of “America is Back”. While decency, democracy, justice, and engagement with the world will return to Washington, the transatlantic alliance as we once knew it will not. However, the capacity Europe is building for itself today, if successful, should be an opportunity to face challenges together, bolstered by our long-standing people-to-people support for each other.
Rising through adversity
In the meantime, Europe must not squander the opportunity to build its strength on the world stage. Not only should its investments in security be quick and ambitious, but policymakers should be keenly aware that the same forces that brought Trump to power in America are alive and well at home.
Europe cannot let this watershed moment only lead to a transformation in security and foreign policy. The success of Ukraine on the battlefield is now not only determined by Ukrainians on the frontlines but also by Europeans at the ballot box concerned about prices at the supermarket, securing a future for their children, fearful of immigration, and feeling scorned by the elite.
Today, as European leaders put their countries on a wartime footing, they must remember they have to give their voters something to fight for – beyond just Ukrainian democracy. Populist forces will claim that the same elites that have robbed “the people,” sent jobs overseas, and pushed their “woke” ideologies are now itching to send your children to fight on the frontlines. Using defense spending to reindustrialize Europe will not restore long-lost jobs nor bring back a sense of purpose and connection to people’s lives.
Cutting social safety nets to create fiscal space will only feed right into the isolationist rhetoric. Without good policies to improve voters’ lives and address their grievances, Europe will end up where the U.S. is today.
So, as a committed transatlanticist, I ask that Europe heed our warnings. On this side of the Atlantic, we will dedicate ourselves to restoring our own democracy in the hopes of one day being able to rise again as your ally. In the meantime, Europe must bring about its own rise, not just through security but in keeping Trumpism at bay at home.
Pablo Rasmussen is a Europe and development analyst who recently served in a policy role in the Biden-Harris Administration. He was previously a consultant on EU-U.S. relations at Albright Stonebridge Group.
